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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 06-4449

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LUIS GUERRERO-GAVIRIA
a/k/a Luis Enrique
Luis Guerrero-Gaviria
Appellant

On Appeal From the United States
District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 06-cr-00119-1)
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 11, 2008
BEFORE: FISHER, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON,
Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: January 16, 2008)

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Guerrero-Gaviria appeals his ninety month sentence for knowingly and unlawfully
reentering the United States without permission. According to Guerrero-Gaviria, his
sentence is unreasonable because the District Court imposed this allegedly excessively
long sentence for the sole purpose of rehabilitation. For the reasons stated below, we will
affirm.
I.
Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the factual context and
procedural history of the case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
Guerrero-Gaviria arrived in the United States when he was ten years old and began
committing crimes at the age of nineteen. First, he was convicted of robbing a passerby
while armed with a knife. Next, he was convicted of conspiring to deliver cocaine and
marijuana. Later, he was convicted on separate occasions of stealing from a retail store,
illegally possessing a firearm, and supplying false documents to the police. Beyond these
convictions, his record also includes multiple arrests, a myriad of parole violations, and
some still-outstanding warrants.
Ultimately, his conviction for conspiring to deliver cocaine and marijuana led to
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his deportation in 2003. But not long after being forcibly removed from the United
States, Guerrero-Gaviria returned to Allentown, Pennsylvania. An arrest for assault in
November 2005 alerted federal authorities to his presence, and he was taken into custody
for unlawfully reentering the United States without permission.
Guerrero-Gaviria pled guilty to the federal charge but asked for a lenient sentence
because he was facing an additional lengthy term in Pennsylvania state prison for
violating his parole. The District Court considered Guerrero-Gaviria’s argument but
concluded that a sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range (seventy-seven to ninetysix months of incarceration) was inappropriate in light of his extensive criminal history.
Instead, the District Court sentenced Guerrero-Gaviria to ninety months of imprisonment,
three years of supervised release, a $2,000 fine and a special assessment of $100.
Guerrero-Gaviria now appeals.1
II.
Guerrero-Gaviria claims that the District Court violated the Sentencing Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), by increasing his sentence solely to make sure that he was
rehabilitated during his prison term. While correct in claiming that a sentence cannot be
lengthened “for the sole purpose of rehabilitation,” Guerrero-Gaviria is incorrect in
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We have jurisdiction over sentencing appeals pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a), and review the ultimate sentence imposed by the District Court for
reasonableness. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006). We review
the District Court’s legal conclusions without deference and its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v.
Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2006).
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claiming that his sentence was lengthened solely for this purpose. United States v.
Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2007). To the contrary, in formulating his
sentence, the District Court relied on Guerrero-Gaviria’s criminal history and potential for
recidivism rather than on any hope of rehabilitation. It noted that Guerrero-Gaviria had
committed “all kinds of crimes,” that he was a repeat offender who had committed more
than one serious offense, that Guerrero-Gaviria’s lacked any “very good reason for [his]
conduct,” and that he had “not learned from the fairly minimal incarcerations . . . that it’s
necessary to be law abiding.” (Appendix at 69, 72.) This, quite correctly, led the District
Court to conclude that Guerrero-Gaviria was not likely to lead an honest life, and
therefore that any “rehabilitation, training, and acquisition of skills” should take place in
an institutional setting “for the protection of society.” (Appendix at 72.)
There is nothing in this record suggesting that Guerrero-Gaviria’s ninety month
sentence was imposed solely so that he could be rehabilitated beyond the District Court’s
perfectly proper comments encouraging him to view his time in prison as a chance to
rehabilitate himself. In fact, the record shows that the District Court formulated
Guerrero-Gaviria’s sentence based on a “meaningful consideration” of the § 3553(a)
factors and the “sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties which have recognized
legal merit and factual support,” as is required by our precedent. Cooper, 437 F.3d at
329, 331; United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, this
claim has no merit.
Guerrero-Gaviria’s alternative claim – his sentence is unreasonably long because
4

he will be incarcerated in Pennsylvania to atone for his parole violations after he finishes
serving his federal sentence – has nothing to commend to it. There is no authority to
suggest that defendants who are facing additional time in a state institution for violating
their parole can use this fact to demand a variance of their federal sentence. Accordingly,
there is no merit to this claim.
III.
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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